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This article analyses some key aspects of structural
change in two small oil-based economies, Iran and
Nigeria, in the past decade.1 It focuses on the
phenomenon sometimes known as the 'Dutch
Disease': a booming oil sector, expanding non-traded
goods (and services) sector, declining or stagnant non-
oil traded goods sector.2 In the developed countries
this phenomenon has been associated with 'de-
industrialisation', while in the less developed countries
and especially among OPEC members it has been
associated with a fall in domestic production of traded
agricultural and industrial goods (except where the
product enjoys high tariff barriers and ¡or import
restrictions), and a boost to construction and services
(both of which are mostly non-traded in terms of the
final product). The analysis is mostly concerned with
the short and medium run effects of this phenomenon
on resource allocation, income distribution, and the
balance of payments. Moreover, given the central role
of the government as the primary recipient of oil
revenues, governments' macro and sectoral expendi-
ture and pricing policies acquire a particular
importance in affecting the direction and the
magnitude of the 'Dutch Disease'.
I The Framework
The Dutch Disease model is based upon a three-
factor, two-commodity full employment model of
production and trade [see Caves and Jones, 1983]. The
economy produces two commodities: one traded
internationally (i.e. exported or imported), the other
traded only domestically since either transport costs
or import restrictions prevent the commodity from
being internationally traded. The two sectors
producing traded and non-traded goods are assumed
to have capital in a fixed amount that is given and
non-shiftable in the short run. The labour force is fixed
Based on the authors DPhil Thesis 'Prices, Output and Economic
Adjustment in Oil Exporting Countries', University of Sussex, 1986.
2 Traded and non-traded here refers to whether or not the commodity
in question is traded internationally. Non-traded goods do not refer
to subsistence goods which are not traded even domestically.
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in the aggregate but mobile between the two sectors.
Thus we have two specific factors, one mobile factor
and two commodities, one internationally traded and
the other not. What follows is based upon a change in
relative commodity prices and how the consequent
price/wage relationships determine factor incomes
and sectoral output.
Higher oil income means more foreign exchange
earnings, more imports, and a fall in the relative price
of traded goods because excess demand raises the price
of non-traded goods which are in limited supply in the
short run. Higher disposable income, the relative price
advantage of traded goods after the boom, plus lower
production of traded goods at home, due to the lower
relative price, increases the demand for imports and
the trade balance deteriorates. The combination of
higher levels of imports and higher relative price of
non-traded goods results in 'adjustment' or
simultaneous internal and external balance. If the real
exchange-rate is defined as the relative price of non-
traded to traded goods, then the higher relative price
of non-traded goods represents an appreciation of the
real exchange-rate.
Given the fixed capital stock and perfectly competitive
markets, the demand for labour in each sector depends
on the wage/price relationship in that sector. The
demand for labour depends negatively on the sectoral
real product wage (ratio of the wage to the sectoral
output price). This means that a rise in the relative
price of one sector by more than the wage would
increase employment and thereby output in that
sector. Increased output would involve higher cost per
unit since it would come about through an increase in
the sector's use of labour per unit of capital, implying a
falling sectoral marginal physical product of labour,
because capital stock is fixed, The mobility of labour
and the immobility of capital means that a change in
the relative price of traded to non-traded goods would
have an uneven impact on factor incomes. Labour
mobility allows labour to shift out of the traded sector,
and thereby maintain or raise its real income, while
capital immobility means that returns to capital fall
sharply in the sector with a lower relative price and
returns to capital in the sector with a higher relative
price rise sharply.
To sum up the discussion so far, the oil boom involves
an appreciation of the real exchange rate, driven by a
rise in the relative price of non-traded goods. The
relative price shift causes a reallocation of labour
towards the non-traded sector; a rise in the output of
non-traded and a fall in the output of traded goods.
Returns to capital in non-traded activities rise, while
returns in traded activities fall. There is an ambiguous
impact on the real wage since the wage in terms of
non-traded goods falls, but rises in terms of traded
goods, so that the net welfare impact on workers
depends upon the composition of the wage basket in
terms of traded and non-traded goods.
The explanation so far has been only in terms of
output price relative to the price of labour while the
price of capital as such has not entered the explanation
of output behaviour. A convenient way of introducing
the price of capital into the analysis is to distinguish
between traded and non-traded capital inputs and
consider how the rise in the relative price of non-
traded goods (and factors) affects the cost of
production and value added in each industry. In a
typical developing country, traded capital inputs
would mainly consist of imported intermediate
commodities such as machinery while non-traded
capital inputs would mainly consist of land. A rise in
the relative price of non-traded goods (and factors)
would raise the cost of production for an activity
which uses land intensively, e.g. construction.
Similarly, a fall in the relative price of traded goods
(and factors) would lower the cost of production in the
sectors which rely heavily on imported inputs, e.g.
manufacturing.
Going back to our model with three factors and two
commodities and distinguishing between traded and
non-traded capital inputs, we arrive at four
possibilities:
labour combined with imported inputs producing
traded goods;
labour combined with land producing traded
goods;
labour combined with imported inputs producing
non-traded goods;
labour combined with land producing non-traded
goods.
Case (j) refers to the domestic manufacturing sector
which is non-protected; case (ii) characterises the
agricultural sector especially with respect to export
crops but also with respect to traded food crops;
(iii) refers to the protected manufacturing sector
mostly producing import substitutes; case (iv)
characterises the construction sector and also non-
traded low value or perishable food crops in
agriculture. The main point to be emphasised is that in
analysing sectoral supply response traded/non-traded
capital inputs should also be considered as they affect
value added in each industry. For example, a traded
goods sector relying on traded inputs would enjoy
some offsetting cost reductions given real appreciation
of the exchange-rate; its value added would fall by less
than if non-traded inputs had a large share in the total
cost. In the construction sector, for example, although
the price of construction and thereby profits in
construction rise with real appreciation, given the
importance of land costs in total costs, higher land
prices (since land is non-traded) are likely to lower
profits.
The Role of Government
Since oil revenues accrue directly to the central
government in oil exporting economies, or at least
governments get a major share of the revenues
through taxation, it becomes critical to look at how
the government spends this money and the impact of
such expenditures on the domestic economy. The
focus here is on public expenditure policy and its
impact on the supply of money, sectoral investment
policy, pricing policy, and credit policy. The level of
public expenditure is the critical factor behind the rise
in aggregate expenditure and the higher price of non-
traded goods.
Moreover, both the intersectoral and the intrasectoral
allocation of public investments are important to the
pattern of sectoral output. The allocation of public
investment towards non-traded goods (such as
infrastructure) would reinforce the shift of private
investment towards the non-traded sector during the
boom, and this would constitute a double drain of
investment resources away from traded goods, with
implications for output in that sector. The main
question within each sector is whether the government
aims at the gradual transformation of the entire sector,
or at a crash modernisation programme which
concentrates resources in the highly commercialised
and capital intensive sub-sectors, resulting in a skewed
pattern of public investment and usually involving
adverse effects in terms of output.
With vastly expanded financial resources, the
government can effectively implement an agricultural
pricing policy programme. The government can set
prices both because it can engage in substantial
purchases in the domestic market as well as resort to
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imports in order to maintain low prices. A higher or
lower official price can therefore become an important
signal for changes in the private sector's production
incentives.
The effectiveness of the agricultural pricing policy
would also depend, however, on whether the
agricultural commodities in question are traded or
non-traded. If the main food staple is wheat, for
example, the possibility of controlling its price is much
greater than if the main food is cassava or yam or
millet which are not commonly traded internationally
because of their high bulk and low value. Even if the
main staple food is non-traded, the government can
indirectly exert downward pressure on its price
through importing near substitutes which are traded.
With higher domestic costs due to the higher price of
non-traded goods, domestic exports and import
competing goods are no longer competitive at world
prices. The higher comparative cost of production in
the oil exporting country gives an advantage to
competing countries in exporting to the oil economy.
Selective tariffs and import controls can provide
protection for some traded goods; but if protection is
raised sufficiently to ensure that the protected sector is
not harmed by the petroleum boom, even though the
real exchange-rate has appreciated, the burden of
adjustment would then fall entirely on the non-
protected traded sectors.
During the oil boom the government is likely to reduce
the average level of tariffs and generally adopt a more
liberal import policy, given its favourable balance of
payments. Lower tariffs can be regarded as a means of
'adjusting' to the balance of payments surplus since
reduction of tariffs and import controls would result
in switching of expenditure towards imports and
thereby lower the level of foreign exchange reserves.
Government can affect the access of industries to cost-
reducing technology and working capital by allowing
or depriving them of credit. Credit policy is also
significant for the small farmers who are the main food
producers. This is because informal credit is usually
difficult to obtain, quite expensive, and leaves little for
the farmer for reinvestment. Informal credit usually
meets only the working capital requirements of the
farmer, leaving a gap as far as credit for adoption of
new technologies is concerned.
Consumer subsidies can prevent the relative price rise
of specific commodities, and depending upon the
importance of that item sectorally, consumer price
subsidies can lower the sectoral price level. Consumers
would therefore divert the extra funds thus released to
the purchase of other non-subsidised goods which
could in the aggregate lead to a similar rise in the level
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of prices. Nevertheless, if the subsidised commodities
form a major part of total consumer expenditure, the
subsidies would cause the price level to be lower than
otherwise and thereby lower the pace of real
appreciation.
II Iran after the 1973 Oil Boom
Rise in aggregate expenditure
High levels of public expenditure followed the 1973 oïl
boom in Iran, leading to high levels of aggregate
expenditure. High growth rates and relative price
stability in the l960s, plus the success of the fourth
plan, had combined to allow a highly optimistic
attitude towards planned targets. In early 1974, the
current fifth development plan was revised without
detailed appraisal, resulting in an increase of 189 per
cent in planned investment expenditure. Moreover,
the shares in planned expenditure of agriculture,
industry, oil and gas declined while the housing and
transport (non-traded) sectors had an increased share.
Public consumption expenditures also rose from the
equivalent of USS 6.3 bn in 1973 to US$ 9.2 bn in 1974
[Bank Markazi Iran 1975/76]. These included both
military expenditures and expenditure on consumer
subsidies (especially for wheat and sugar). Between
1973 and 1978 public coñsumption expenditures in
Iran rose at 12.2 per cent (real terms) per year. Private
consumption expenditures rose between 1973 and
1978 by almost 10 per year in real terms, while gross
domestic fixed capital formation rose il per cent per
year.
The rise in domestic expenditure meant a growth in
demand for both imports and non-traded goods.
Aggregate merchandise imports had an astronomic
escalation, rising from US$ 5.Obn in 1972 to
US$ 16.5 bn in 1977. Throughout the boom period,
serious bottlenecks - notably port congestion - were
created as a result of the shortage of non-traded
commodities.
Consumer prices in the 1973-78 period rose by at least
12.8 per cent per year. Rising prices of imports do not
account for the rate of inflation, since imported
inflation was no more than 6 per cent per year in the
1973-78 period. Moreover, some of the important
staple foods such as wheat and sugar were heavily
subsidised. The real exchange-rate with the US dollar
appreciated by 35.3 per cent during the 1973-78
period.
Non-Oil GDP and its Components
a Relative prices
Table 1 shows the cumulative changes in the GDP
deflator for the main sectors of non-oil GDP before
and after the oil boom:
Table I
Cumulative percentage price change of main sectors
% GDP
(19 73-78)
weight in
1962/72 1973/78 GD?
Source: Calculated from Bank Markazi Iran, Annual
Reports, various years.
Construction had the fastest relative price growth in
both periods. Before the boom the prices of
manufactured goods declined relative to agriculture
but rose relative to services. After the boom however,
the relative price of manufactured goods fell
compared to all other sectors and agricultural price
rises decelerated. Prices of services rose least before
the boom and accelerated considerably afterwards.
The acceleration of price increases for construction
and the sharp rise in the price of services are consistent
with the economic analysis presented in section one.
b Price of Labour
The wage-rate, although relatively stable in the 1960s,
rose rapidly after the boom. Wages and salaries in
construction rose by 27 per cent per year during the
1973-78 period and rises were similar for all sectors
other than government. Wages and salaries of the
goverment sector rose only 13.3 per cent per year, but
remuneration in the government sector does not
reflect market forces, and in any case fringe benefits
are not included in these estimates. Therefore, it will
be assumed that nominal wages grew at about 27 per
cent per year for the economy as a whole, which
implied an average annual growth of 13 per cent in the
real wage. GDP deflators for the main sectors of the
GDP had the following annual trend growth rates:
construction 29 per cent, manufacturing 9.7 per cent,
services 13.3 per cent and agriculture also 13.3 per
cent. In other words, the wage rate rose relative to
agriculture, manufacturing and services output prices
but it fell relative to construction. The rise in the wage
relative to the price of agricultural commodities
reflects the cheap food policy which was followed in
Iran in this period, a policy which was made possible
by the largely traded character of the main staple food
in Iran, namely wheat.
The only sector where wages and prices do not
conform to the model is in the service sector, since
services are usually assumed to be non-traded but
wages (in non-government services) rose faster than
the GDP defiators for services. Part of the explanation
for the relatively slow price rise of services is the large
share (about 35 per cent) of total value added in
services attributable to government services. The
GDP deflator for services rose only as much as wages
and salaries in the government sector, or by 13.3 per
cent per year. Services also benefited from the
presence of traded inputs, e.g. in transport. The
transport sector was also highly subsidised and this
prevented price rises in that sector. The presence of
subsidised services and the large share of government
services in total value added in the service sector thus
neatly illustrates the impact of government policy
upon the relative price predictions of the Dutch
Disease model.
Sectoral Growth of Non-oil GDP
There is also a sharp contrast in the sectoral growth of
non-oil GDP before and after the boom. Before the
boom, manufacturing and mining grew at 12.3 per cent
per year in real terms, followed by services which grew
at 11 per cent per year, construction (7.6 per cent) and
agriculture (4.2 per cent). After the boom, on the other
hand, manufacturing (and mines) and agriculture
were the lagging sectors, while services and
construction achieved rates of growth above the 1962-
72 average. The contrast is especially clear for the
manufacturing and agriculture sectors, where output
growth fell.
There were three types of industrial performance in
Iran after the boom: first, declining industries, second,
industries with slow growth (below 10 per cent) and
third, industries with fast growth (over 10 per cent).
The declining industries were textiles and sugar;
industries with slow growth were television assembly,
glass making and footwear. The fast growth industries
were refrigerators, food processing, passenger cars,
tyres, brick-making and paper. Relationships existed
among the growth of output, the import dependence
of inputs and the level of protection.
Textiles and sugar, for example, both in the low
import dependence category (less than 33 per cent of
imported inputs in total sales value), did not enjoy
price protection, and both industries produce traded
commodities. The fast growing industries include
brick-making, the output of which is non-traded,
highly-protected passenger cars and refrigerators. The
other fast growing industries were all in the highly-
mechanised group. In the slow growth industries,
footwear is highly mechanised, while television and
sheet glass both enjoyed heavy protection. The 1973-
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Agriculture 37.7 88.0 (40)
Manufacture 22.4 69.7 (12)
Construction 70.0 216.7 (4)
Services 10.5 98.4 (35)
78 period, therefore, saw a relative fall in the rate of
industrialisation of Iran, but with an uneven impact
on the industrial structure. Import dependent, capital
intensive, and protected industries grew, while
traditional industries such as textiles and sugar
declined. The period is one of perverse re-
industrialisation rather than de-industrialisation.
Imported capital goods became cheap relative to
labour; and the degree of substitution of machinery
for labour depended, among other things, on the
firm's access to credit, which in turn is very much
influenced by the government's credit policy.
Industrial lending was confined to a small group of
large manufacturing enterprises. The bulk of
industrial credit was largely out of reach of smaller
manufacturing establishments, which were on the
bazaar for their credit and marketing, and more
dependent on the local economy for their inputs.
In 1973-78, services had a continuous and stable
growth of 16 per cent per year, while construction
growth accelerated to 10.9 per cent per year. Although
the relative price of construction output rose, its costs
also rose rapidly because of the importance of land
and labour (non-traded factors of production) in
construction. Thus at the initial round of price
increases, the price of construction, e.g. houses, goes
up and pulls up profits with it. The higher derived
demand for construction inputs in turn leads to a rise
in wages and land prices and consequently lowers
profits in the construction sector.
In the agricultural sector, there was a general
stagnation of internationally traded crops in this
period, while non-traded crops, such as fresh
vegetables, had considerable growth mostly through
the activities of the small informal sector. Commodities
such as cotton (which was an export crop) declined,
since Iranian cotton was non-competitive for export
purposes; the country in fact began to import cotton
products. Regarding traded crops, especially wheat,
production performance was very much influenced by
government's maintenance of a cheap food policy
made effective through large quantities of imports.
What is, however, more interesting and somewhat
puzzling is how the experience of traded crops in the
agricultural sector is different from the experience of a
number of fast growing industries producing traded
goods. One important contrast is in the credit-
worthiness of agriculture and manufacturing and their
differential access to credit and modern technology.
The fast-growing capital-intensive industries clearly
fared better in these respects.
The Industrial and Mining Development Bank of
Iran, and the host of measures to boost the industrial
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sector initiated in the 1960s, meant that a number of
selected industries with continued access to official
support could withstand the adjustment in relative
prices and costs much better than other industrial
sub-sectors and other traded goods. The agricultural
sector, however, inherited a weak and fragmented
production structure after land reform and the
resultant uncertainties. This, plus the pro-industrial
bias of the government, resulted in increased
vulnerability of the agricultural sector to rising costs.
The agricultural sector generally suffered from lack of
credit-worthiness, hence lower access to cost-reducing
technology and therefore less ability to respond to
Dutch Disease. The examples of modernisation in the
sector were few and insignificant. Once again,
structural and institutional factors affected the
outcome of the Dutch Disease syndrome.
Ill The Case of Nigeria
The impact of the oil boom on the Nigerian economy
was in many respects similar to that in Iran, although
differences in the initial conditions, structure, and
policy options led to somewhat different results. The
unexpected rise in Nigeria's oil income led to a sharp
increase in aggregate expenditure, which began with a
massive boost to public çonsumption expenditures.
Starting with 1972-73 as the base year, the index of
Nigerian Federal Government spending rose from 100
in 1972-73 to 1,250 in 1977-78. The spending began
with a massive wage and salary increase for the civil
service, followed by sharp increases in public capital
expenditure on large infrastructure, social services,
and to a lesser extent on economic services.
Major increases in shares of public investment went to
transport, communications, power and education;
while agriculture, manufacturing and mines, and
health had reduced shares. Both before and after the
boom, the share of infrastructure and services was
considerable; and in the post-boom period, about
80 per cent of all public investments were in physical
and social infrastructure and public services - all
reinforcing the movement of resources towards non-
traded goods. The allocation of 2.5 per cent of the
government's budget in 1981 and 1982 for the
establishment of a new capital city at Abuja was a
supreme example of how public funds are diverted
towards the production of non-traded goods.
Of the remaining 20 per cent allocated to agriculture
and industry, the bulk was in large projects. In
industry, almost half the allocations were for the
build-up of the steel industry, while small-scale
industries had planned allocations of less than five per
cent in the Fourth Plan. In spite of lack of
encouragement by the government, the number of
small-scale industries grew at an average rate of 32 per
cent per year between 1974 and 1978. This is an
important point concerning the type of development
which is encouraged by government policy. Expendi-
ture is largely concentrated in non-traded and large
expensive projects in the traded sectors of the
economy, while the small-scale sector is badly
neglected; it is the small industries which are the most
domestic resource-based and have a great potential for
viable industrial diversification.
Of all public investments in the 1975-79 period,
agriculture received only 7.1 per cent of all allocations.
If irrigation is also included under agricultural
investment, then the share goes up to 9.9 per cent. In
Federal Government allocations alone, the share
drops to 2.4 per cent (5.9 with irrigation) while state
governments give greater priority to this sector,
allocating a little over 10 per cent of their budgets.
Again within agriculture, the bulk of investment is in
large-scale food crop projects and large-scale
irrigation. Interestingly, the share of irrigation alone is
larger than the rest of agriculture combined in the
Federal Government's actual capital spending in
1980. Also, over 80 per cent of so-called agricultural
investment by the Federal Government has been in
fertiliser procurement and distribution, reflecting a
highly skewed pattern of expenditure.
Gross Domestic Product and its Components
According to official statistics, between 1973 and
1981, GDP in current prices rose at 15.6 per cent per
year and non-oil GDP rose at almost the same rate of
15.7 per cent. The official estimate of the growth of
output of the agricultural sector is likely to include an
under-estimate for food crops. Inflation reduced real
GDP growth to 3.2 per cent and real non-oil GDP
growth to 4.3 per cent per year.
In the same period, real agricultural output fell by two
per cent per year, while the GDP deflator for
agriculture rose at 14.4 per cent per year. Changes in
the agricultural output differ greatly year by year.
Nominal wages in agriculture rose on average at
20 per cent per year between 1973 and 1980, or at
14.5 per cent if we take the 1973-79 period. Real wages
in agriculture only rose in the first two years after the
oil boom, declined until 1979, and then suddenly rose
again in 1980. The contribution of agriculture to GDP
at constant prices declined from 31 per cent in 1973 to
22 per cent in 1981.
Within agriculture, crop production had the worst
decline of three per cent per year, although food crops
fared better than export crops. The only export crop
showing positive production growth was palm oil.
Livestock and fishing, however, were growing
gradually at one per cent per year. It appears that the
national accounts are based on the Federal Office of
Statistics data, which have the most pessimistic
estimates regarding crop production, particularly
food crops. Using alternative sources such as the
USDA data, for example, agricultural output would
not have fallen as much as indicated by the national
accounts.
Manufacturing as a whole grew by 9.4 per cent per
year in real terms, while manufacturing prices grew at
9.9 per cent per year, lagging behind the average rate
of inflation in the economy. Moreover, the growth of
manufacturing was highly uneven.
Construction and building had a highly unstable
growth rate. Rapid price rises in 1974 and 1975 were
followed by a sudden growth of output in 1976 and
1977, and by a period of recession in 1978 and 1979,
and then picked up again in 1980. Steep price rises in
1974 and 1975 in the construction sector were followed
by a period of continuous decline of the real price from
1977 onwards. The output of the sector grew on
average at 7.0 per cent per year, and prices at 8.7 per
cent per year, which is below the GDP deflator for the
economy as a whole. The share of the construction and
building sector in GDP rose from 10 per cent in 1973
to l2per cent in 1981.
The price index of the trade sector rose by 14.6 per cent
per year, which is above the average inflation rate for
the economy; while the prices of services as a whole
grew almost at par with the growth of the GDP
deflator. Government services are also part of the
service sector, and the Udoji awards of 1975 almost
doubled the salaries of the civil servants. The
wholesale and retail trade's contribution to GDP rose
from l9percentin 1973 to 22percent in 198l,almost
matching the agricultural sector. The service sector as
a whole increased its share from 31 per cent of GDP in
1973 to 37 per cent in 1981.
For the 1973-81 period as a whole, we find that the
GDP deflator for trade, transport and agriculture rose
above the average GDP deflator for the economy,
while manufacturing and - surprisingly - con-
struction rose less than the average GDP deflator. A
weighted average of the nominal wage growth for the
1973-78 period indicates that nominal wages rose at
15 per cent compound per year in the 1973-80 period,
which is above the average growth of the non-oil GDP
deflator. The growth of nominal wages, however, is
practically the same as the growth of GDP deflator for
agriculture, trade and transport. In other words,
wages were stagnant relative to price rises in these
three sectors, while they rose relative to manufacturing
and construction prices. In terms of sectoral price rises
and the relative real wage, the Nigerian outcome is
different from Iran, where agricultural prices rose less
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than the non-oil GDP deflator, while in Nigeria they
exceeded it. Also, in Iran, construction prices had the
fastest growth of all, while in Nigeria they rose below
the average rate of inflation. The experience of the
transport and trade sectors also differed, with prices
lagging behind inflation in Iran, but outpacing
inflation in Nigeria. In both cases, however, general
manufacturing sector prices rose less than prices in
general.
Regarding wages, there is also an interesting contrast.
Wages rose in Iran in terms of agriculture,
manufacturing and service prices, while they fell
relative to construction. In Nigeria, the wage rise was
only clear relative to manufacturing and construction
prices, while wages did not rise relative to prices in
agriculture and services.
This again shows the importance of government
policy in determining the outcome of adjustment.
Overall, real wages rose more in Iran than in Nigeria.
In Iran, the government followed an effective, cheap
food policy and the prices of importable staple foods,
such as wheat, declined in real terms in the 1970s. In
Nigeria on the other hand, the index of agricultural
prices generally rose above average inflation in the
economy; and also food prices as a whole rose faster
than the consumer price index. Moreover, in Nigeria
the real exchange-rate appreciated by more than
double that of Iran. The rise in food prices in Nigeria
and the consequent rise in the consumer price index
were greater than in Iran. This is an important result
which shows the key significance of sector-specific
government policies (in this case food pricing policy)
in determining the outcome of the higher levels of
expenditure for the economy and the intensity of the
appreciation of the real exchange-rate. A key result
which emerges at this point is the predominantly non-
traded character of food in Nigeria (cg cassava, millet,
etc.), in contrast to Iran where massive food imports
kept food prices below the rate of inflation.
The growth of the manufacturing sector, as we also
found for Iran, is not fully compatible with the model
unless we introduce government intervention in the
form of tariffs and/or subsidies to the traded
manufacturing sector; these in fact have been provided
in both countries. In Nigeria, the sectors with least
price rise appear to have had the fastest real growth
(manufacturing and construction), while sectors with
the fastest price increases had the lowest growth rates
(agriculture and services). In other words, in terms of
explaining real output growth, the model presented at
the beginning does not allow very definite conclusions
to be drawn. By introducing the role of government
one can obtain more definite results which, although
modifying the predictions of the model, maintain its
overall strength in explaining economic performance
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in these two countries.
Conclusions
This article has discussed the theoretical structure and
two empirical applications of the so-called 'Dutch
Disease' model. It has been shown that both Iran and
Nigeria followed a high expenditure path for adjusting
to the accumulation of financial surpluses in their
balance of payments. The high level of expenditure in
both cases was the result of rapid increases in public
expenditure, especially on the non-traded sectors such
as infrastructure, housing and transport. Increase in
public expenditure was followed by an increase in
private expenditure. The rise in overall aggregate
expenditure meant an increase in the relative price of
non-traded goods.
The theory predicted that returns to capital in non-
traded activities would exceed the rise in non-traded
prices, which in turn would exceed the rise in the wage
rate; each of these would exceed the rise in prices and
returns in internationally traded activities.
The observed outcomes, however, were somewhat
different, mainly because of government intervention.
In Iran, wages rose relative to agriculture, manu-
facturing and services prices, but fell relative to
construction prices. The rise in wages relative to
agriculture prices reflects the cheap food policy in Iran
which was made possible by (a) the financial strength
of the government and (b) the largely traded character
of food in Iran (especially wheat). Prices of services
were very much influenced by direct government inter-
vention, in the form of consumer price subsidies on
public transport, and the large share of government in
the total value added in the service sector. In spite of
the non-traded character of services, their prices did
not rise faster than wage-rates because of government
intervention. In Nigeria, on the other hand,
agriculture had the fastest price rise, and this can be
explained largely in terms of the non-traded character
of food staples in Nigeria and the absence of an
effective cheap food policy. Wages rose in parallel to
the rise in food prices, as did the price of services,
reflecting the fact that, in large part, income from
services is identical to the wage because of the self-
employed and non-traded character of most services.
On the output side, the role of government
intervention is critical, since with the exception of
construction in Iran the sectors with the least price rise
had the fastest real growth rates. In Nigeria, in
contrast to Iran, the bulk of construction activities has
been in non-residential building and specifically in
publicly-sponsored construction in physical infra-
structure. Moreover, protection and promotion of
selected manufacturing activities has allowed main-
tenance of high profit margins in spite of the erosion of References
margins caused by the faster growth of prices than Bank Markazi, Iran, Annual Report and Balance Sheet,
wages. various years.
Caves, R. E., and R. W. Jones, 1983, World Trade and Pay-
ments: an introduction, Little, Brown, Boston (Mass.) 3rd
edition, ch.6
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